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Passini, R. (1999). Sign-posting information design. In R. Jacobson
(Ed.), _Information design_ (p. 83-98). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Exploration of information design as, in general, an important and new
field. Information design, the term, is not new but has recently become
associated with the design of effective communication. This is the result
of information becoming a very important commodity in business, social
and personal circles. Information design, as described by Passini, is
distinguished from graphic design by its greater attention to content
and its research underpinnings in information theory and cognitive
sciences. Effective design comes from understanding the function of the
information. One common function is problem solving. Passini relates the
specific problem solving act of wayfinding to illustrate the issues in
information design. Wayfinding deals with the cognitive and behavioral
aspects of purposefully finding a physical destination. In that context
good information design places helpful information at decision points
along the route but also attempts to minimize potentially confusing
clutter which may also upset the physical art and architecture of the
building. With this final point Passini is able to suggest a pathway by
which information design can legitmize itself as a profession: architects
and graphics designers must work together to create effective signage
for wayfinding. For that combination to work well both disciplines need
additional training in the other discipline. This is not practical given
already crowded training schedules. Passini suggests the information
designer, with training from both areas alongside background education
in behavioral research, can bridge the gap between the architect and
the graphic designer, creating new and rewarding careers. -cjd
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Referring to:
Passini, R. (1999). Sign-posting information design. In R. Jacobson
(Ed.), _Information design_ (p. 83-98). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 01:23:51 -0500 (EST)
From: cdent@burningchrome.com
To: ejacob_597ia_fall01@indiana.edu
Subject: Passini v. HCI
Passini states:
In fact, a strong argument can be made that design solutions can
only be properly assessed by potential users--regardless of how
confident the designer is about the proposed design.
but then goes on to say:
There is also a danger, however, in relying solely on assessment
research to build a discipline: it tends to be conservative. Although
it produces improvements on present conventions, it is not
particularly well suited for generating new ideas and questioning
existing assumptions and practices.
To me this suggests that the HCI discpline is, at its core, rather
conservative. I think this is generally supported by the literature:
user testing is used to create systems which perform according to
expectations. Rare is the intentional disturbance of patterns of
behavior resulting in revolutionary new ways of doing things (the
distinction between revolution and evolution is important here).
A damn shame, I say. I want to see technology help rip me free of
hackneyed ideas and behaviors. Why do current interfaces on many
computers attempt to suggest a desktop, as if sitting at a desk were
actually a good thing?
I think, as Passini suggests, there must be an edge where new things
happen. Not everyone will want to be out there on the edge, but
somebody needs to do it.
e-yawning...,
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Barsalou, L. W. (1992). Representation. In _Cognitive Psychology: an
overview for cognitive scientists_ (p. 52-56 only). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Discussion of representational systems in the mind as understood by
cognitive scientists wherein there is a target domain and a modelling
domain. In the modelling domain only some of the structure of the
target domain is represented: only some of it is relevant. This
discussion is accompanied by an effective rebuttal of critics of
cognitive science whom suggest that cognitive psychologists believe
people are computers. -cjd
-=-=-
Excellent. I've been waiting for such an article. I'm one of the people
who have worried about cogsci being too mechanistic. This article
helps to clear up some of that fear. In addition it indicates a strong
relationship with traditional (library science based) notions of
organization and representation of knowledge. By extension the model
in the article implies that with training information providers can
present various representations of bodies of knowledge that
effectively emphasize certain structural aspects of the domain in
unexpected ways.
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Barsalou, L. W. (1992). Representation. In _Cognitive Psychology: an
overview for cognitive scientists_ (p. 52-56 only). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
-=-=-
In Dillon's 542 class a term paper has been assigned. This paper is to
be of any topic that we desire as long as we are able to relate it to
Human Computer Interaction in some way. My interest, at the moment, is
to seek out research which comments on why the computer is special
enough to rate it's own discipline of interaction instead of being a
subset of a larger discipline, perhaps called Human Tool Interaction.
The cited (above) Barsalou article gave an insight into one possible
cause: The computer, while in the strictest sense a tool in the same
sense as a hammer, provides a rare function in an especially powerful
way. That function is the provision of representations.
Or, to put it another way, the special nature of the computer hinges
on its ability to _quickly_ throw alternate representations or
facilitate the creation thereof. The computer can augment at a base
cognitive level, beyond the physical level at which most tools
operate. Books and other information tools can do so as well but with
less speed and less responsiveness.
These thoughts appear to be the beginning thread of something that
could tie the work of Barsalou (representation), Suchman
(interactivity and the way it resembles intentional behavior),
Engelbart (augmentation), Winograd and Flores (the computer as a
language processor) and others that will be discovered along the
way.
The final goal of such a work would hopefully be to draw it all together
to reestablish and refocus the computer not as an agent, or an
interactive machine, or an intentional intelligence but as a tool designed
to augment in a very specific but extremely abstract way.
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Muhlhausen, J. (2000). Wayfinding is not signage: signage plays an
important part of wayfinding, but there's more. Available at:
http://www.signweb.com/ada/cont/wayfinding0800.html
Wayfinding--locating and directing oneself in unfamiliar spaces--involves
explicit signage but also many other artifacts and cues which impact or
assist decision making (formulating an action plan) and decision executing
(implementing the plan). Effective wayfinding communicates a good
sense of where a person is and where they need to go to get where they
are going. Additionally it suggests where not to go. There are four
primary communicative elements: graphic communication, audible
communication, tactile communication, consistency of clues.
-=-=-
This little article was quite interesting in and of itself--the notion
of subtle clues which suggest but don't force behaviors is very
appealing--however, it's relevance as a general metaphor for
information spaces is quite elegant.
Building architecture, as a discipline, has matured to the point where
subtle inferences, such as the burbling of a lobby fountain indicating
a public space, are accepted and expected. With research and practical
experience, the same will be true for information spaces. This will be
a welcome change: modern information architectures are heavy-handed
and blatant structures comprising dusty cinder blocks. In the future
we will see information accesses happening as absent-minded or
abstracted gestures into an ethereal but nonetheless structured space.
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Norman, D. (1999). Chapter 3: The power of representation (p. 43-75).
In _Things that make us smart_. Cambridge: Perseus Books.
Without necessarily meaning to do so, Norman spends chapter 2
explaining what it is that the computer applications that Landauer, in
_The trouble with computers_, describes as phase two ought to be
doing. At the same time much of what he says is reminescent of
Winograd's and Flores's discussion of the linguistic and
representational powers of the computer. (Neither of them are
mentioned.)
Computers are powerful artifacts for manipulating representations.
They, properly designed, can make it easy to experiment with various
representations until one that transforms, as Norman says is
desirable, the information discovery task from a difficult reflective
one to an easy experiential one.
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Norman, D. (1999). Chapter 4: Fitting the artifact to the person (p.
77-113). In _Things that make us smart_. Cambridge: Perseus Books.
Goodness how I loathe Norman sometimes. 36 pages to say that we need
to be concerned with the human when we create representations with
computers. Really? I did not know that Johnny.
A novel bit that did come of this chapter is an interesting paradox
presented by computers. In effective tools there is an easy to grasp
surface representation of the function and state of the tool. Complex
technology blows this because the relationship between the surface
representation and internal representation is very abstract. The
paradox is that the whole point of complex technology is to create
abstract representations. If we expose that nature we may make the
understanding of technology easier.
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